

others before he thinks of himself may become a Grand Master of the Elks, a Socialist of parts, or the star guest of honor at public banquets, but he will never become a great or successful artist, statesman, or even clergyman.

Happiness is the goal of every normal human being. As it is given to few men to die happy, the best that man can hope and strive and pray for is momentary happiness during life, repeated as frequently as the cards allow. Pleasure, whatever its species, is the drink in the desert. It is the beautiful, transient reward of travail and pain. There is no other reward.

31. THE ORIGIN OF MORALS *

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)

A. ALTRUISM NOT THE ORIGIN OF MORALS

The English psychologists are the only philosophers who are to be thanked for any endeavor to get as far as a history of the origin of morality. But it is certainly a pity that they lack the *historical sense* itself, that they themselves are quite deserted by all the beneficent spirits of history. The whole train of their thought runs, as was always the way of old-fashioned philosophers, on thoroughly unhistorical lines: there is no doubt on this point.

The crass ineptitude of their genealogy of morals is immediately apparent when the question arises of ascertaining the origin of the idea and judgment of "good." "Man had originally," so speaks their decree, "praised and called 'good' altruistic acts from the standpoint of those on whom they were conferred, that is, those to whom they were useful; subsequently the origin of this praise was *forgotten*, and altruistic acts, simply because, as a sheer matter of habit, they were praised as good, came also to be felt as good—as though they contained in themselves some

intrinsic goodness." This view *must* be brought low, this system of values must lose its values.

B. ARISTOCRATIC MAN VERSUS THE VULGAR

Now the first argument that comes ready to my hand is that the real homestead of the concept "good" is sought and located in the wrong place: the judgment "good" did *not* originate among those to whom goodness was shown. Much rather has it been the good themselves, that is, the aristocratic, the powerful, the high-stationed, the high-minded, who have felt that they themselves were good, and that their actions were good, that is to say, of the first order, in contradistinction to all the low, the low-minded, the vulgar, and the plebeian. It was out of this pathos of distance that they first arrogated the right to create values for their own profit, and to coin the names of such values: what had they to do with utility?

The standpoint of utility is as alien and as inapplicable as it could possibly be, when we have to deal with so volcanic an effervescence of supreme values, creating and demarcating as they do a hierarchy within themselves: it is just at this juncture that one arrives at an appreciation of the contrast to that tepid temperature, which is the presupposition on which every combination of worldly wisdom and every calculation of practical expediency is always based—and not for one occasional, not for one exceptional instance, but chronically. The pathos of nobility and distance, as I have said, the chronic and despotic *esprit de corps* and fundamental instinct of a higher dominant race coming into association with a meaner race, an "under race," this is the origin of the antithesis of good and bad.

C. THE ORIGINAL FORM OF MORALITY: THE ARISTOCRATIC MAN GOOD, THE VULGAR MAN BAD

It is because of this origin that the word "good" is far from having any necessary connection with altruistic acts, in accordance with the superstitious belief of these moral philosophers. On the contrary, it is on the occasion of the *decay* of aristocratic values, that the antitheses between "egoistic" and "altruistic" presses more and more heavily on the human conscience; it is,

* *Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924), XIII (*The Genealogy of Morals*), 17-57, in part. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

to use my own language, the *herd instinct* which finds in this antithesis an expression in many ways.

And even then it takes a considerable time for this instinct to become sufficiently dominant, for the valuation to be inextricably dependent on this antithesis (as is the case in contemporary Europe); for today the prejudice is predominant, which, acting even now with all the intensity of an obsession and brain disease, holds that "moral," "altruistic," and "disinterested" are concepts of equal value.

D. HISTORICAL MEANING OF ETHICAL TERMS CONFIRMS THIS VIEW

The guide-post which first put me on the *right* track was this question: What is the true meaning of the various symbols for the idea "good" which have been coined in the various languages? I then found that they all led back to *the same evolution of the same idea*: that everywhere "aristocrat," "noble" (in the social sense), is the root idea, out of which have necessarily developed "good" in the sense of "with aristocratic soul," "noble" in the sense of "with a soul of high calibre," "with a privileged soul"—a development which invariably runs parallel with that other evolution by which "vulgar," "plebeian," "low," are made to change finally into "bad."

The most eloquent proof of this last contention is the German word *schlecht* itself; this word is identical with *schlicht*, which, originally and as yet without any sinister innuendo, simply denoted the plebeian man in contrast to the aristocratic man. It is only during the Thirty Years' War that this sense becomes changed to the sense now current. From the standpoint of the Genealogy of Morals this discovery seems to be substantial: the lateness of it is to be attributed to the retarding influence exercised in the modern world by democratic prejudice in the sphere of all questions of origin.

It is of no small interest to ascertain that in those words and roots which denote "good" we catch glimpses of that arch-trait on the strength of which the aristocrats feel themselves to be beings of a higher order than their fellows. Indeed, they call themselves in perhaps the most frequent instances simply

after their superiority in power (e.g., "the powerful," "the lords," "the commanders,") or after the most obvious sign of their superiority, as, for example, "the rich," "the possessors" (that is the meaning of *Aryan*).

In the Latin *malus* (bad) the vulgar man can be distinguished as the dark-colored, and above all as the black-haired, as the pre-Aryan inhabitants of the Italian soil, whose complexion formed the clearest feature of distinction from the dominant blondes; namely, the Aryan conquering race; at any rate, Gaelic has afforded me the exact analogue: *Fin*, the distinctive word of the nobility; finally, good, noble, clean, but originally the blonde-haired man in contrast to the dark black-haired aborigines.

The same is true substantially of the whole of Europe; in point of fact, the subject race has finally again obtained the upper hand, in complexion and the shortness of the skull, and perhaps in the intellectual and social qualities. Who can guarantee that modern democracy, still more modern anarchy, and indeed that tendency to the "Commune," the most primitive form of society, which is now common to all the Socialists in Europe, does not in its real essence signify a monstrous reversion—and that the conquering and *master* race—the Aryan race, is not also becoming inferior physiologically? Must not our actual German word *gut* [good] mean "*the godlike*," "the man of godlike race," and be identical with the national name (originally the noble's name) of the *Goths*?

E. JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY INVERT THE TRUE ORDER; I.E., THE HERD MAN IS GOOD, THE ARISTOCRATIC MAN IS EVIL

All the world's efforts against the "aristocrats," the "mighty," the "masters," the "holders of power," are negligible by comparison with what has been accomplished against those classes by *the Jews*—the Jews, that priestly nation which eventually realized that the one method of effecting satisfaction on its enemies and tyrants was by means of a radical transvaluation of values, which was at the same time an act of the *cleverest revenge*. Yet the method was only appropriate to a nation of priests, to a nation of the most jealously nursed priestly revengefulness.

It was the Jews who, in opposition to the aristocratic equa-

tion (good = aristocratic = beautiful = happy = loved by the gods), dared with a terrifying logic to suggest the contrary equation, and indeed to maintain with the teeth of the most profound hatred (the hatred of weakness) this contrary equation; namely, "the wretched are alone the good; the poor, the weak, the lowly, are alone the good; the suffering, the needy, the sick, the loathsome, are the only ones who are pious, the only ones who are blessed, for them alone is salvation—but you, on the other hand, you aristocrats, you men of power, you are to all eternity the evil, the horrible, the covetous, the insatiate, the godless; eternally also shall you be the unblessed, the cursed, the damned!" It was, in fact, with the Jews that the *revolt of the slaves* begins in the sphere of morals; that revolt which has behind it a history of two thousand years, and which at the present day has only moved out of our sight because it—has achieved victory.

But you understand this not? You have no eyes for a force which has taken two thousand years to achieve victory?—There is nothing wonderful in this: all *lengthy* processes are hard to see and to realize. But *this* is what took place: from the trunk of that tree of revenge and hate, Jewish hate—that most profound and sublime hate, which creates ideals and changes old values to new creations, the like of which has never been on earth—there grew a phenomenon which was equally incomparable, *a new love*, the most profound and sublime of all kinds of love;—and from what other trunk could it have grown?

But beware of supposing that this love has soared on its upward growth, as in any way a real negation of that thirst for revenge, as an antithesis to the Jewish hate! No, the contrary is the truth! This love grew out of that hate, as its crown, as its triumphant crown, circling wider and wider amid the clarity and fulness of the sun, and pursuing in the very kingdom of light and height its goal of hatred, its victory, its spoil, its strategy, with the same intensity with which the roots of that tree of hate sank into everything which was deep and evil with increasing stability and increasing desire.

This Jesus of Nazareth, the incarnate gospel of love, this "Redeemer" bringing salvation and victory to the poor, the sick,

the sinful—was he not really temptation in its most sinister and irresistible form, temptation to take the tortuous path to those very *Jewish* values and those very *Jewish* ideals? Has not Israel really obtained the final goal of its sublime revenge, by the tortuous paths of this "Redeemer," for all that he might pose as Israel's adversary and Israel's destroyer?

F. MIGHT MAKES RIGHT, THE BASIS OF ARISTOCRATIC MORALITY

The method of the slave man is quite contrary to that of the aristocratic man, who conceives the root idea "good" spontaneously and straight away, that is to say, out of himself, and from that material then creates for himself a concept of "bad"! This "bad" of aristocratic origin and that "evil" out of the caldron of unsatisfied hatred—the former an imitation, an "extra," an additional nuance; the latter, on the other hand, the original, the beginning, the essential act in the conception of a slave morality—these two words "bad" and "evil," how great a difference do they mark, in spite of the fact that they have an identical contrary in the idea "good"!

But the idea "good" is *not* the same; much rather let the question be asked, "Who is really evil according to the meaning of the morality of resentment?" In all sternness let it be answered thus: *Just* the good man of the other morality, just the aristocrat, the powerful one, the one who rules, but who is distorted by the venomous eye of resentfulness, into a new color, a new signification, a new appearance.

This particular point we would be the last to deny. These aristocratic men who in their relations with each other find so many new ways of manifesting self-control, loyalty, pride, and friendship, these men are in reference to what is outside their circle [that is, toward the *slave* or *herd* men] not much better than beasts of prey which have been let loose. They enjoy there [among the *herd* men] freedom from all social control; they feel that in the wilderness they can give vent with impunity to that tension which is produced by enclosure and imprisonment in the peace of society; they *revert* to the innocence of the beast-of-prey conscience, like jubilant monsters, who perhaps come from a ghostly bout of murder, arson, rape, and torture, with bravado

and a moral equanimity, as though merely some wild student's prank had been played, perfectly convinced that the poets have now an ample theme to sing and celebrate.

It is impossible not to recognize at the core of all these aristocratic races the beast of prey: the magnificent *blonde brute*, avidly rampant for spoil and victory; this hidden core needed an outlet from time to time, the beast must get loose again, must return into the wilderness—the Roman, Arabic, German, and Japanese nobility, the Homeric heroes, the Scandinavian Vikings, are all alike in this need.

It is the aristocratic races who have left the idea "Barbarian" on all the tracks in which they have marched; nay, a consciousness of this very barbarianism, and even a pride in it, manifests itself even in their highest civilization (for example, when Pericles says to his Athenians in that celebrated funeral oration, "Our audacity has forced a way over every land and sea, rearing everywhere imperishable memorials of itself for *good* and for *evil*").

This audacity of aristocratic races, mad, absurd, and spasmodic as may be its expression; the incalculable and fantastic nature of their enterprises—Pericles set in special relief and glory the rashness of the Athenians, their awful joy and intense delight in all destruction, in all the ecstasies of victory and cruelty—all these features become crystallized, for those who suffered thereby in the picture of the "barbarian," of the "evil enemy," perhaps of the "Goth" and of the "Vandal." The profound, icy mistrust which the German provokes, as soon as he arrives at power—even at the present time—is always still an aftermath of that inextinguishable horror with which for whole centuries Europe has regarded the wrath of the blonde Teuton beast.

Granted the truth of the theory now believed to be true, that the very *essence of all civilization* is to *train* out of man, the beast of prey, a tame and civilized animal, a domesticated animal, it follows indubitably that we must regard as the real *tools of civilization* all those instincts of reaction and resentment by the help of which the aristocratic races, together with their ideals, were finally degraded and overpowered. These bearers

of vindictive instincts that have to be bottled up, these descendants of all European and non-European slavery, especially of the pre-Aryan population—these people, I say, represent the *decline* of humanity!

G. CONFLICTS BETWEEN ARISTOCRATIC MORALITY AND HERD MORALITY

Let us come to a conclusion. The two opposing views, "good and bad" [that is, aristocratic man good, slave man bad] and "good and evil" [that is, slave man good, aristocratic man evil], have fought a dreadful, thousand-year fight in the world, and though indubitably the slaveman's view has been for a long time in the preponderance, there are not wanting places where the fortune of the fight is still indecisive.

The symbol of this fight is called "Rome against Judaea, Judaea against Rome." Hitherto there has been no greater event *than that* fight, the putting of *that* question, *that* deadly antagonism. Rome found in the Jew the incarnation of the unnatural, as though it were its diametrically opposed monstrosity, and in Rome the Jew was held to be *convicted of hatred* of the whole human race; and rightly so, in so far as it is right to link the well-being and the future of the human race to the unconditional mastery of the aristocratic values, of the Roman values.

What, conversely, did the Jews feel against Rome? The Romans were the strong and aristocratic; a nation stronger and more aristocratic has never existed in the world, has never been dreamed of; every relic of them, every inscription enraptures, granted that one can divine *what* it is that writes the inscription.

H. HERD MORALITY HAS TRIUMPHED

Which of them has been provisionally victorious, Rome or Judaea? But there is not a shadow of doubt; just consider to whom in Rome itself nowadays you bow down, as though before the quintessence of all the highest values—and not only in Rome, but almost over half the world, everywhere where man has been tamed or is about to be tamed—to *three Jews*, as we know, and *one Jewess* (to Jesus of Nazareth, to Peter the fisher, to Paul the tentmaker, and to the mother of the aforesaid Jesus,

named Mary). This is very remarkable: Rome is undoubtedly defeated.

At any rate there took place in the Renaissance a brilliantly sinister revival of the classical ideal, of the aristocratic valuation of all things: Rome herself, like a man waking up from a trance, stirred beneath the burden of the new Judaized Rome that had been built over her; but immediately Judaea triumphed again, thanks to that movement of revenge which is called the Reformation, the restoration of the Church—the restoration also of the ancient graveyard peace of classical Rome.

Judaea proved yet once more victorious over the classical ideal in the French Revolution, and in a sense which was even more crucial and even more profound: the last political aristocracy that existed in Europe, that of the *French* seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, broke into pieces beneath the instincts of a resentful populace—never had the world heard a greater jubilation, a more uproarious enthusiasm; indeed, there took place in the midst of it the most monstrous and unexpected phenomenon: the ancient ideal *itself* swept before the eyes and conscience of humanity with all its life and with unheard-of splendor, and in opposition to resentment's lying war-cry of *the prerogative of the most*, in opposition to the will to lowliness, abasement, and equalization, the will to a retrogression and twilight of humanity, there rang out once again, stronger, simpler, more penetrating than ever, the terrible and enchanting counter-war-cry of *the prerogative of the few!* Like a final sign-post to other ways, there appeared Napoleon, the most unique and violent anachronism that ever existed, and in him the incarnate problem of *the aristocratic ideal in itself*—consider well what a problem it is: —Napoleon, that synthesis of Monster and Superman.

I. MAN CAN ONLY BE SAVED IF THE ARISTOCRATIC MORALITY DESTROYS THE HERD MORALITY

Was it therewith over? Was that greatest of all antitheses of ideals thereby relegated for all time? Or only postponed, postponed for a long time? May there not take place at some time or other a much more awful, much more carefully prepared

flaring up of the old conflagration? Further! Should not one wish *that* consummation with all one's strength?—will it oneself? demand it oneself?

He who at this juncture begins, like my readers, to reflect, to think further, will have difficulty in coming quickly to a conclusion—ground enough for me to come myself to a conclusion, taking it for granted that for some time past what I mean has been sufficiently clear, what I exactly *mean* by that dangerous motto which is inscribed on the body of my last book: *Beyond Good and Evil*—at any rate that is not the same as “Beyond Good and Bad.”

32. WHAT ARE THE TRUE ENDS OF LIFE? *

Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677)

After experience has taught me that all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else; whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness.

I say, “I finally resolved,” for it seemed unwise willingly to lose hold on what was sure for the sake of something uncertain. I could see the benefits which are acquired through fame and riches, and that I should be obliged to abandon the quest of such objects, if I seriously devoted myself to the search for something different and new. I perceived that if true happiness chanced to be placed in the former, I should necessarily miss

* *Spinoza Selections* (edited by John Wild; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), pp. 1–4.